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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-AccEPTANCE OF CHECK MARKED IN

FULL PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT-Plaintiff, potato grower, contracted

with defendants, partners and potato buyers, to deliver potatoes of
specified quality at stated price. After delivery a dispute arose between plaintiff and defendant, E. C., as to quality of potatoes delivered. E. C. gave plaintiff a check, with notation, "Balance on potatoes" thereon, which check was for a less amount than claimed by
plaintiff. Plaintiff accepted and cashed check. Before trial E. C.
died. Held: That evidence of an agreement between plantiff and
E. C. to submit the amount due to three impartial men for determination being incompetent under the statute,' and the check with notation
thereon having been cashed, without other explanation of the inten2
tion of the parties, there was an accord and satisfaction.
Prior to 1875 North Carolina followed the common law, which is
at present the majority holding,3 and held that when the amount due
was liquidated and there was no dispute an agreement to take part
in discharge of the whole debt was without consideration and therefore void. 4 When, however, the amount due was uncertain or in
dispute the payment of a less sum than claimed, if received in discharge of the whole, furnished consideration to support the promise
to forego the balance. 5 The reason being that in the former case the
payor is doing only what he is under a legal duty to do, while in the
later case his duty is not fixed.
The former cases followed the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer,6 which
has frequently been criticised by courts and law writers as commercially unwise. 7 In 1875 North Carolina yielded to this criticism by
the enactment of a statute. 8 This statute differs from similar statutes

'N. C. CoNs. STAr. ANN. (1919) §1795. Provides that upon the trial of
an action, a party interested in the event shall not be examined as a witness in
his own behalf, concerning a.
transaction between himself and a deceased person.
'Walston v. Coppersmith, 197 N. C. 407, 149 S. E. 381 (1929).
'Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 1035; 4 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2nd ed., 1920) §2507.
'McKenzie v. Culbreth, 66 N. C. 534 (1872); Bryan v. Foy, 69 N. C. 45
(1873).
Matthis v. Bryson, 49 N. C. 508 (1857).
6Foakes v. Beer, 54 L. J., Q. B. 130, 9 App. Cas. 605, 51 L. T. 833, 33
W. R. 233. H. L. (E) (1884).
*Leading article-Ames, Two Theoriest of Consideration (1899), 12 HARv.
L. Rzv. 515, 525; 4 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2nd ed., 1920) §2507; 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) §120.
'N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) §895. "In all claims, or money demands,
of whatever kind, and howsoever due, where an agreement is made and ac-
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passed in other states 9 in that any agreement, whether executed or
executory, to settle a claim by payment in part is valid, 10 and in that
no written agreement, receipt, or release is required."
Since the passage of the statute our courts have consistently held
that where the claim is in dispute or unliquidated, a payment of part,
if accepted in satisfaction of the whole, will serve, apparently because
of the statute, as a complete discharge of the claim. 12 However,
when there are two claims only one of which is in dispute, the payment of the liquidated amount will not act as a discharge of both
claims' s unless it is proved that such payment was offered and ac14
cepted with the understanding that it would discharge both claims.
In cases where payment was made by check it was held, from
1875 to 1915, that a payment of part in satisfaction of the whole
would act as a complete discharge of the debt without regard to
whether the claim was liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or not. 1
cepted for a. less amount than that demanded or claimed to be due, in satisfaction thereof, the payment of the less amount according to such agreement in
compromise of the whole is a full and complete discharge of the same."
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1929) §120, n. 47.
" In several states an agreement actually executed by the payment of part
of a debt discharges the debt in accordance with the intention of the parties;
but an executory agreement to pay part is insufficient consideration: Georgia,
GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §4329; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 84,
§59; Virginia, V.&. CODE ANN. (1924) §5765; and perhaps California, CA..
Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) §1698.
' Statutes in several states give to a written receipt or written agreement
to accept a part payment in full the same effect which the common law gave

to a release under seal: Alabama, ALA. Civ. CODE (1923) §5643; California,
CAL.CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) §1524; North Dakota, N. D. Comp. LAws ANN.
(1913) §5828; Oregon, ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) §778; South Dakota, S. D.
Rv. CODE (1919) §787; and Tennessee, TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1918)

§5571.
" Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Farmers Federation Inc., 195 N. C. 702, 143
S. E. 471 (1928); De Loache v. De Loache, 189 N. C. 394, 127 S. E. 419
(1925) ; Calkins Dredging Co. v. State, 191 N. C. 243, 131 S.E. 659 (1926) ;
Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 N. C. 432, 107 S. E. 451 (1921) ; Armstrong,
Cator & Co. v. Lanon, 149 N. C. 434, 63 S.E. 101 (1908) ; Petit v. Woodlief,
115 N. C. 120, 20 S.E. 208, 26 L. R. A. 321 (1894).
"Bogert & Hopper v. Henderson Mfg. Co., 172 N. C. 248, 90 S.E. 208
(1916) ; Aydlett v. Brown, 153 N. C. 334, 69 S.E. 243 (1910).
'Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 N. C. 432, 107 S.E. 451 (1921).
'Armstrong, Cator & Co. v. Lanon, 149 N. C. 434, 69 S.E. 101 (1908);
Thomas v. Gwyn, 131 N. C. 460, 42 S.E. 904 (1902) ; Davis Sulphur Ore Co.
v. Powers, 130 N. C. 152, 41 S.E. 6 (1902) ; Wittkowsky v. Baruch, 127 N. C.
313, 37 S.E. 449 (1900), (one of the strongest cases in support of the statute) ;
Kerr v. Sanders, Orr & Co., 122 N. C. 635, 29 S.E. 943 (1898) ; Petit v. Woodlief, 115 N. C. 120, 20 S.E. 208, 26 L. R. A. 321 (1894) ; Koonce v. Russell,
103 N. C. 179, 9 S.E. 316 (1889), (this case declared N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN.
(1919) §895 constitutional).

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
In 1915 the court, having more in mind the common law than the
statute, held the element of dispute necessary.1 6 Since then North
Carolina has adhered to this view in check cases,17 the legislative
language "in compromise of the whole" being relied upon in later
decisions. Such a ruling nullifies the original purpose of the statute
since consideration has always been conceded in cases of settlement
of disputed claims at common law. If this line of cases can not now
be over-ruled, it is to be hoped that the construction will not be extended to settlements other than by check.
The present case seems, neverthless, to have been correctly decided.
Mooix BRYsoN.
BANKS-JOINT DEPosITs-SuRvIvoPSHIP-A husband deposited
money in a bank on time deposit taking a certificate of deposit in his
own name, payable to himself or his wife on return of the certificate
properly indorsed. Held: in an action between the husband's administratrix and the wife's executrix, not to constitute a gift inter %ivos
of the deposit to the wife, but the mere appointment of the wife as
agent to withdraw money, which agency terminated at the death of
the husband.'
Joint bank accounts deposited in the names of the husband and/or 2
wife with or without survivorship expressed have become very fiumerous. The reasons for their creation usually are: (1) to furnish a
family account or fund, (2) to furnish the survivor with cash while
"Rosser v. Bynum, 168 N. C. 340, 343, 84 S. E. 393, 394 (1915), (defendant

sent check marked "For lbr. to date" to plaintiff who cashed same. Hoke, J.,
says, "On perusal of the record, we do not find that any dispute had arisen
between the parties when the check was given, and applying the doctrine as
stated, (When, in case of a disputed account between parties, a check is given
and received in full for all indebtedness to date, the courts will allow to such
payment the effect contended for.) . . . we must hold that there was error in
in reference to the testimony hearing on the matter").
the charge
T

Bogert &Hopper v. Henderson Mfg. Co., 172 N. C. 248, 90 S. E. 208 (1916);
Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 N. C. 432, 107 S. E. 451 (1921) ; De Loache v.
De Loache, 189 N. C. 394, 127 S. E. 419 (1925); Calkins Dredging Co. v.
State, 191 N. C. 243, 131 S. E. 659 (1926) ; Shapleigh Hardware Co.'v. Farmers Federation Inc., 195 N. C. 702, 143 S. E. 471 (1928), (in this case the
court recognized the departure from the former cases which held no dispute

was necessary, but gave no reason why one should now be essential although
it so holds).
'Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929).
'For various holdings depending upon the word used, see (1900) 17 Bankiug L. J. 430 m. (1923) ; (1923) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 48.
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the decedent's estate is being probated, and (3) to evade inheritance
4
taxes and the formalities of making a will.

The right to survivorship has usually been sustained but upon
several different theories. 5 One view is to call the transaction a
gift,0 but there are difficulties here :7 (1) There is no delivery
unless of the pass book. (2) The depositor's withdrawal privilege
is inconsistent with intent to divest hmiself of the present ownership.
Other courts have sustained the right of survivor by working out
a trust.8 But this is also objectional. 9 (1) The parties generally
have no intention to create a trust. (2) The settlor's intent to be
able to draw is inconsistent with regarding himself as trustee, and
the bank cannot be trustee of its own debt. (3) The donee's power
to draw from the fund is legal rather than equitable.
A number of courts resort to a joint tenancy,10 or a tenancy by
the entirety."1 But the right of either the husband or wife to with-

draw the whole of the fund is greater than the limited proportionate
interests of joint tenants.1 2 Nor are joint tenancies favored today
in most states.' 3
The best reasoned cases protect the survivor on the ground that
the beneficiary depositor receives title to the account by a third-party
beneficiary contract,14 even in states which Aiormally do not enforce
such undertakings. 15
- With the law in this confusion it was only natural that the banks
should seek protection when they were asked to pay the survivor
'First National Bank of Birmingham v. Lawrence, 212 Ala. 45, 101 So. 663
(1924), 42 Banking L. J. 237.

"McDougald v. Boyd, 172 Cal. 753, 159 Pac. 168 (1916); (1926-27) 75 U.
of P. L. R. 369.
'Cases collected in Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 189.
'In re Johnson's Estate, 218 N. W. 739 (Neb. 1928); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Du Mortimer, 193 Mo. App. 290, 183 S. W. 1137 (1916); Note L. R. A.
1917C, 556.
'Thomas v. Huston, 181 N. C. 91, 106 S.E. 466 (1921); (1921-22) 31 YALE
L. J. 776; COSTIGAN'S CASES ON TRUSTS (1925), 299.
'Williams v. Savings Bank of Santa Rosa, 33 Cal. App. 655, 166 Pac. 366
(1917).
"(1924-25) 38 HLv.L. Ra-. 243; CoSTIGAN'S CASES ON TRUsTS (1925), 299.
"Havens v. Havens, 213 N. Y. S.230 (1925) ; Siemanaski v. Union Bank of
South Chicago, 242 Ill. App. 390 (1926).

'Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966 (1916); cf. (1923-24) 2 N. C.
L. Ray. 195; (1927-28) 13 IowA L. Rav. 108.
'Appeal of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 Atl. 459 (1927).
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919), §§1734, 1735.
"Reder v. Reder, 312 Ill. 209, 143 N. E. 418 (1924); COSTIGAN'S CASES ON
TRUSTS (1925), 301.

'Chippendale

v. North Adams Saving Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371

(1916) ; COSTIGAN'S CASES ON TRUSTS (1925), 301.
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according to the terms of the account. It was largely through their
influence that provisions were inserted in the banking acts of many
states to the effect that where words of survivorship are used the bank
is protected in making payment to the beneficiary. 16 Unfortunately
these statutes, as construed, have not affected the question as between
17
the beneficiary and the depositor's estate.
Perhaps the most strenuously argued objection to this convenient
banking device is that it violates the statute of wills, especially where
it appears that the withdrawal power was not to be exercised until
after the depositor's death. 18 Except in such cases, however, the
present availability of the funds has usually prevented the transaction from being testamentary. 19 On the other hand, inheritance tax
statutes have frequently been held applicable. 20
The situation often arises, as in the instant case, that the words
providing for survivorship are left off the card signed by the depositor upon opening the account. Here again the courts are in
conflict. Some hold that the account is merely for convenience, the
wife's power to draw being revoked at her husband's death.2 1 Others
22
that the husband is presumed to have intended survivorship.
The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority in
holding that death revoked the power or agency. 28 It is believed,
however, that the court unduly emphasizes form in finding that it
was a single deposit in the name of the husband alone. In Houle v.
McMillian,24 under a similar statute, the court regarded the joint
power to withdraw as a more important indication of the character
of the deposit. This would seem to be correct.

N. S.

SOWERS.

'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919), §230. Some think that the omission of
this section from the Banking Act of 1921, probably operates to repeal it. (1928)

45 Banking L. J.897.
"In re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249, 164 N. W. 372 (1917) ; (1925-26)
11 Coax. L. J.525; (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rnv. 87.
'Smith v. Planter's Saving Bank, 124 S.C. 100, 117 S.E. 312 (1923)
(1923-24) 9 CoRt. L. J.48; CosnGAN's CASES oN TRusTs (1925), 300.
" Supra note 4.
' Marble v. Jackson, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N. E. 442 (1923) ; In re Dolbler's
Estate, 171 N. Y. S. 364 (1918).
'Godwin v. Godwin, 141 Miss. 633, 107 So. 13, 43 Banking L. 3. 649 (1926).
" Supra note 3.
'SSupranote 18.
Houle v. McMillian, 263 Pac. 409 (Cal. 1928).
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BILLS AND

NOTES-IMPERSONATION

OF PAYEE-LIABILITY OF

DPiAEE-Should the drawee bank bear the loss caused by the fraud
of an impostor to whom the drawer delivered a check believing said
impostor to be another person? An affirmative answer was rendered
by a Georgia Court of Appeals in a recent case 1 where the fraud was
effected by mail. But where the drawer delivers check to the impostor personally an opposite conclusion is reached 2 in accord with the
majority elsewhere.
Courts have drawn the distinction between the two types of deliveries because of different interpretations of the drawer's intent which
is said to be of a dual nature.8 (1) He intended to make the check
payable to the physical being standing before him, or to the physical
being with whom he had corresponded and who had induced him to
act; and, (2) he intended to make the check payable to the person
whom the physical being before him purported to be, or to the person
whom he supposed his correspondent to be. In the direct delivery
cases, the former is said to be his primary intention, while in the
mailing cases the latter is said to be primary. If the first is construed to be the controlling intent the drawee has discharged its
liability in the proper way 4 and there has been no forgery which
'Moore v. Moultrie Banking Co., 148 S. E. 311 (Ga. App. 1929). Accord:
Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N. Y., 1876) ; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman,
132 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (App. Div., 1911), aff. in 210 N. Y. 567, 104 N. E. 1134
(1914). Contra: Boatsman v. Stockman's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac.
764 (1914); Metzger v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 359, 21 N. E. 973 (1889);
Hoffman v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 217, 222, 96 N. W.
112 (1901) ; Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac.
1080 (1923).
'Milner v. First Nat. Bank of Waynesboro, 145 S. E. 101 (Ga. App., 1928).
Accord: Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturer's Liability Ins. Co., 94 N. J.

Law 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920); Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E.
619 (1886) ; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S. W. 895
(1924) ; McCornack. v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N. W. 542, 52
A. L. R. 1297 (1926). Contra: Tolman v. American Nat. Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48
Atl. 480, 52 L. R. A. 877 (1901); Western Union v. Bimetalic Bank, 68 Pac.
115 (Colo. App., 1902).
'By analogy, it is held in the law of sales that where the vendor makes
direct delivery title passes to the impersonator (voidable between the parties)
but where the sale is made by correspondence no title passes because the vendor
did not intend to sell to the person ordering the goods unless he was the person
he represented himself to be. WILLIsToN, SALEs (2nd. Ed.), §635.
' "Where one deposits money in a bank on general deposit, the bank immediately becomes the debtor of the depositor for the money deposited, and
undertakes, impliedly, to pay that money either to the depositor or to some
person to whom he directs it paid, and in order to discharge itself from this
liability to the depositor the bank must pay the money to the depositor or as
directed by him." Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Burke, 81 Ga. 597, 600, 7 S. E. 738,
739, 2 L. R A. 96, 99 (1888) ; Nat. Dredging Co. v. Farmer's Bank, 22 Del.
580, 69 Atl. 607, 137 Am. St. Rep. 158, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.), 593 (1908).
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would render the instrument inoperativeP and of no value as a basis

of claim. 6
Making the results depend upon the effectuation of the drawer's
intent involves artificial argument and leads to uncertainty and a lack
of uniformity in the decisions. In the last analysis it must be admitted that the drawer did not intend to pay money to a confidence
man or other fraudulent person, and that he did intend the bank to
pay over his money to the bona fide business man or donee whom he
named as payee.
A depositor is under a duty to his bank not to increase the risk
it assumed under their contract. 7 If by negligent conduct he does
increase this risk, and the bank sustains a loss by reason of this
breach of duty, the depositor should be made liable to the bank for
the amount of the loss. To prevent a circuity of actions this loss
might be debited against the depositor's account. The test of the liability would be that of ordinary negligence with which we are already
familiar in banking law 8 where the depositor is careless in the drawing and signing of his checks, in the custody of executed checks, et
cetera. Why would not this method of determining liability for a
loss as between depositor and bank be likewise effective in cases like
the one in question? The simplicity of application, the increased
certainty of justice, and the long experience of the courts in applying
the tests of negligence would seem to indicate its superior advantages.9
YOUNG M. SMITH.

"Negotiable Instruments Law, §23; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919), §3003;
Impostor might be prosecuted for forgery under the criminal law even though
the indorsement is declared not to be a forgery in a civil suit. State v. Reed,
137 S. C. 444, 135 S. E. 877 (1926).
'Tolman v. American Nat. Bank, supra note 2; Note (1912) 60 U. of Pa. L.
REV. 443.
" See supra note 4; Boatsman v. Stockman's Nat. Bank, supra note 1, and
cases therein cited.
'Young v. Grote, 5 L. J. (0. S.) C. P. 165, 4 Bing. 253 (1827) ; (1918) 28
YALE L. J. 414; Note (1917) 31 HA.v. L. REv. 779; (1919) 17 MIcH. L. REv.
427; Broadstreet Bank v. Nat. Bank of Goldsboro, 183 N. C. 463, 112 S. E. 11
(1922) ; (1915) 28 HA~v. L. REv. 624; Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Savings
Bank, 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N. E. 379, 34'L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100 (1911); Note
(1912) 60 U. of PA. L. REv. 443.
' On the applicability of the negligence test in an action by a purchaser of a
negotiable instrument against the drawer thereof, there is a split of authority
dependent upon the question of the duty owed by the drawer to the purchaser.
See S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan Co., 192 Mo. App. 476, 182
S. W. 777 (1916) ; Nat. Exchange Bank of Albany v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 87
N. E. 779, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 402 (1909).
The possibility of a similar disagreement arising in an action by a purchaser against the drawer is recognized
where the facts are like those in the principal case if the negligence test is used
a2s herein urged.
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CONTRACTS -

INSTALLMENTS -

CANCELLATION FOR BREACH

North Carolina case,1 the plaintiff contracted to sell defendant 50,000 yards of Army duck cloth at
a stipulated price, subject to provisions that if the production of the
mill should be curtailed by strikes or unavoidable cause, deliveries of
installments of the order were to be made in proportion to production; that delay or defects in quality in any installment should not
be cause for cancelling any portion of the contract other than the
delivery in question; and that the contract should be subject to regulation by the seller of the amount of credit to be extended. The
defendant buyer claimed that the contract was void for want of
mutuality. Judgment for plaintiff sustained.
The authorities disagree as to when, in the absence of express
stipulations, breach of an installment contract creates in the other
party a power to terminate the whole transaction. The English
Sales of Goods Act 2 provides that such a power does not arise unless
the breach in question manifests an intention to repudiate the remainder of the contract. This view is shared by some American
courts.3 Others, however, including North Carolina, 4 hold that the
test is the materiality of the breach from the point of view of the
victim. This has been adopted by the American Sales Act, and there
are variations between these extremes. In any event, important and
difficult issues of fact as to the effect of the breach must be tried by
a jury.
Business houses engaged on a national scale in distributing goods
by installment deliveries have, as a result of this confusion, been
driven to write into their contracts specific terms designed to limit
the buyer's power of cancellation, with respect to the types of piecemeal breaches more likely to occur, such as those of delay or defects
in quantity or quality, to the particular installment delivery in question. It was inevitable, however, that the buyer, whose probable
powers were thus cut down, should, when sued for his own breach
of contract, urge as Er defense some supposed lack of mutuality. The
EFFECT OF LImiTATIONs-In a recent

1

Wellington-Sears and Co. v. Dize Awning and Tent Co., 196 N. C. 748, 147
S. E. 13 (1929).
St. 56 & 57 Vict. C. 71, §31, Subd. 13 Chitty's Stats. (6th. ed. 1913) 19,
note (P.) 2. See 25 Halsbury's Laws of England 220; WIU.IsroN, SALES,
(2nd. ed., 1924) §467a.
WILLXsroN, SALES (2nd. ed., 1924), §467c.
' N. C. Highway Comm. v. Rand, 195 N. C. 799, 143 S. E. 851 (1928).
'AuERCAN SALES ACT, §45. WiLLISToN, SALES (2nd. ed., 1924) §465b;
Helgar v. Warner's Features, 222 N. Y. 449, 119 N. E. 113 (1918).
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contention has been denied, however, when the shoe pinched the
other foot and the contract gave the buyer the power of paying a
6
reduced price for a delivery of inferior goods, or of cancelling
7
Conversely, that the
the whole contract for shipping delays.
8
seller may arrange details of shipment, may regulate the amount of
credit to be extended,9 or that he may even terminate the contract in
case of an indeterminable future event, 10 unless that privilege is too
arbitrary, 1 does not strip the deal of mutuality; likewise, as to pro2
visions adapting performance to situations caused by strikes' or
emergencies.18
In a word, a contract does not lack mutuality because every obligation of one party has not been met by an equivalent counterobligation. 14 Subsidiary provisions will not render an otherwise
5
enforceable contract void unless their terms imperatively demand it.1
The principal case is in accord with the North Carolina Court's
6
previous expressions of good sense on related occasions.'
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONTINUANCE-SPEEDY TmiAL.-In the recent
North Carolina case of State v. Daniels,' the defendant, having been
arrested, indicted and arraigned within one hour, was denied a new

'Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Ore. 30, 76 Pac. 946 (1904).

'Neola: Elevator Co. v. Knuckman, 185 Ia. 1254, 171 N. W. 743 (1919);
Kent Lumber Co. v. Montborne, 272 Pac. 957 (Wash. 1928).
"Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal and Coke Co. 240 Ill. App.
216 (1926) ; Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R Co., 89 N. J. L. 336,
98 Atl. 410 (1916) ; U. S. v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, 32 S. Ct. 128, 56 L. ed. •
269 (1911).
9
Mendel v. Converse and Co., 30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S. E. 586 (1923);
Overall Co. v. Converse and Co., 148 S. E. 349 (Ga. 1929).
Klimax
" 0Wessel v. Seminole Phosphate Co., 13 F. (2d.) 999 (C. C. A. 4th., 1926).
'Hunt v. Stimson, 23 F. (2c.) 447 (C. C. A. 6th., 1928).
" Wood and Co. v. Van Deursen, 122 Okla. 19, 250 Pac. 524 (1926) ; Klimax
Overall Co. v. Converse and Co., supra note 9.
"Wood and Co. v. Van Deursen, supra note 12; Neola Elevator Co. v.
Knuckman, supra note 7; Small Co. v. Lamborn and Co., 267 U. S. 248, 45 S.
Ct. 300 (1925) ; Wessel, Duval and Co. v. Crozet Cooperage Co., 143 Va. 469,
130 S.E. 393 (1925).
" Carter Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb. 409, 66 N. W. 536 (1896) ; Wood and Co. v.
Van Deursen, supra note 12.
"Slater v. Savannah Co., 28 Ga. App. 280, 110 S. E. 759 (1922).
"'Am. Steel & Wire Co. v. Copeland, 159 N. C. 556, 75 S. E. 1002 (1912);
Erskine v. Chevrolet Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706 (1923); Fawcett v.
Fawvcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926). See Corbin, Effect of Options on
Consideration (1925) 3 YALE L. J. 571, 583.
'State v. Daniels, 197 N. C. 285, 148 S. E. 244 (1929).
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trial in the absence of an exception to "the short time intervening
between the arrest and the arraignment."
The right of the accused in a Federal court to a "speedy and public trial" is guaranteed by the Constitution. 2 The same right is recognized in state courts.3 It is not constitutionally guaranteed in North
Carolina, but it is asserted in both statutes 4 and judicial holding.8
However, a reasonable and necessary delay because of a crowded
docket is not a violation of the right.
In the occasional absences of a congested docket, there have been
several instances where the right of the accused to a speedy trial has
been accelerated to the point that the correlative right to a continuance has been greatly reduced. In the absence of a statute giving
some definition to the word "speedy" it seems that the state may
arrest a man in the morning, indict him in the afternoon, and try him
at night; and that, unless some other very obvious abuse of discretion by the trial judge is apparent, the appellate court will not
listen to the objection of the condemned that he was given a hasty
trial which allowed little time for preparing a defense.0 The question then arises as to when and under what circumstances the ac'Constitution of U. S., Amendment VI. The first eight amendments to the
Federal constitution apply only to the Federal government.
*State v. Webb, 155 N. C. 426, 429, 70 S. E. 1064, 1065 (1911), stating:
"The right of a person formally accused of a crime to a speedy and impartial
trial has been guaranteed to Englishmen since Magna Charta, and to all peoples
basing their system of jurisprudence on the principles of common law."
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §4521, which peremptorily requires a release
upon bail of a prisoner committed for felony unless the prisoner's prayer in
open court to be brought to trial be followed by an indictment in the next term
of court, and a discharge of the prisoner if not indicted by the second term.
'This statute was enacted in the days when it was the usual thing for the county
to have only two terms of criminal court each year. Its utility seems to have
been little since it has been considered by the Supreme Court in only one case,
State v. Webb, supra note 3. Additional evidence of the favor given to speedy
dispatch of court proceedings is found in the provisions for special terms of
court, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§1449-1457, and the regulations for special and emergency judges, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1435(a)-1435(j).
"State v. Webb, supra note 3.
"State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 130 S. E. 848 (1925), the defendant was
arrested at 9:30 A.M., at 1 P.M. the grand jury returned an indictment, and
at the night session of the same day the trial was held although the defendant
filed an affidavit that he was not prepared for trial and that certain witnesses
were necessary for his defense. In State v. Sultan, 142 N. C. 569, 54 S. E. 841
(1906), the defendant was given only four hours to prepare for trial, and on
appeal it was held no error. In State v. Burnett, 184 N. C. 783, 115 S. E. 57
(1922), the defendants, having testified in a liquor prosecution that they owned
a still, were ordered into custody, indicted and immediately arraigned, and continuance refused, although the judge did postpone the trial until the next day;
it was held that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing the continuance.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
cused may secure a continuance. A continuance may be sought before
term time by submitting an affidavit, thirty days before such term
and after three days notice to the adverse party, which must satisfy
the court, or the judge, that the applicant has been diligent and that
by reason of uncontrollable circumstances he can not have a fair
trial at the regular term. 7 A continuance may be secured during
term time if the judge is satisfied that the applicant has been diligent
and that he can not have a fair trial by reason of circumstances stated,
which came to his knowledge too late to be availed of by an application before the term, and that this application is made as soon after
the knowledge of the facts as it reasonably could be.8 If the cause
for continuance is the absence of a witness, the affidavit must contain the name and residence of the witness, the facts expected to be
proved by him, and a statement that the applicant expects to procure
this evidence at or before some named subsequent term. The provisions for seeking a continuance show a dislike of postponements.
It is not ground for continuance that-an absent witness would testify
to the defendant's great provocation, 9 nor that there was great public
excitement, 10 nor that the judge had tried the defendant's brother in
a previous week," nor that the testiinony of an absent witness was
material where defendant did not indicate the character or nature of
his defense,' 2 nor that a witness is absent when another witness could
give identical testimony,' 8 nor that a witness is absent when the state
introduced the named and supposedly absent witness to contradict
the statement of defendant as to what he expected to prove,' 4 nor
that a material witness is absent when the state has admitted that the
witness would "testify to the fact" and the defendant had accepted
the offer.15 It is held that ruling on a motion for continuance is a
discretionary power of the trial judge, whose ruling the higher court
is loath "to review or disturb" unless a clear or palpable error is
shown, or unless the "circumstances prove beyond doubt hardship
'N.C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §559.
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §560.
State v. Sheppard, 1 N. C. 51 (1792).
"0State v. Norris, 2 N. C. 429 (1796).
11
State v. Baldwin, 178 N. C. 687, 100 S.E. 348 (1919).
' State v. Rodman, 188 N. C. 720, 125 S.E. 486 (1924).
" State v. Daniels, 164 N. C. 464, 79 S.E. 953 (1913).
"'State v. Bishop, 98 N. C. 773, 4 S.E. 357 (1887).
' State v. Fain, 177 N. C. 120, 97 S.E. 716 (1919), distinguishing State v.
Twiggs, 60 N. C. 142 (1863).
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and injustice."' 8 No appeal lies from a continuance because no appeal lies in a criminal case until, a judgment of a final nature. 17 A
recent dictum, prior to State v. Daniels, raised some doubt whether
our highest court would continue to follow blindly the precedents. 18
The diligence required of the state and its representatives is not
of such an extraordinary nature as to require prosecution before
adequate preparation. Nor should their diligence be carried to the
extent of depriving the accused of his right to have counsel and to
confront his accusers with other testimony.' 9 It would seem, therefore, that the reasoning in State v. Daniels, to the effect that the plea
of guilty was a waiver of the right to have time to employ counsel
or to get witnesses, overlooks the fact that the trial had already begun
when the plea was made. It also seems to overlook the probable
inability of the accused to ascertain his rights upon such brief notice.
A. K. SMITH.
State v. Sultan, supra note 6; State v. Dewey, 139 N. C. 556, 51 S. E. 937
(1905) ; State v. Burney, 162 N. C. 613, 77 S. E. 852 (1913) ; State v. English,
164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72 (1913) ; State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 814, 130 S. E.
848, 850 (1925), stating that the modern application of the rule is as follows:
"When the discretion of the trial judge is exercised with a reasonable degree
of judicial acumen and fairness, it is one which the higher courts are loath to
review or to disturb. The mere fact that the case was disposed of with unusual
dispatch is not an ear mark of error. .. . While it is not necessary, to constitute abuse, that the court shall act wickedly or with intentional unfairness, it is
essential to show the commission of a clear or palpable error, without the correction of which manifest injustice will be done." In the earlier cases it was
held that the refusal to continue a case rests in the judge's discretion and that
the Supreme Court had no power to review it. State v. Duncan, 28 N. C. 98
(1845) ; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. 429 (1849) ; State v. Lindsey, 78 N. C.
499 (1878), which gave an intimation of a probable change in view; State v.
Scott, 80 N. C. 365 (1879) ; and State v. Panky, 104 N. C. 840, 10 S. E. 315
(1889).
' State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722 (1881).
'State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 26, 136, S. E. 193, 194 (1927), in which it is
stated: "In the next place the exception addressed to the refusal of the court
to grant the prisoner's motion for a continuance, at least until the second week
of the term, in order that he might prepare his defense, presents a question
which if we were compelled to decide on the present record, would probably
find us in disagreement. While ordinarily this is a matter resting in the sound
discretion of the trial court, nevertheless it should be remembered that the
prisoner has the constitutional right of confrontation, which cannot lawfully
be taken from him, and this includes the right of a fair opportunity to present
his case." (Italics ours.)
"N. C. Constitution, Article I, §11, states: "In all criminal prosecutions
every man has the right to be informed of the accusation against him and to
confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and to have counsel
for his defense, and not be compelled to give evidence against himself. . ....
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSION

OF

GUILT BY SILENCE-INCOMPETENCY

prosecution,' evidence,
by a third party, that the defendant's wife, at the time of arrest said
to her husband, "I told you John that you would get into it if you
did not stay with me like I wanted you to do," and that he replied
to her, "Hush," was held properly admitted. C. S. §18022 was held
not to apply because the communication was not confidential and also
because the wife did not attempt to give evidence against her husband.
Justice Brogden in a dissenting opinion gives two reasons why
the evidence should be held incompetent: (1) because her exclamation was not an accusation that he burned the house, for it did not
appear that she then knew the specific crime with which he was
charged, (2) because its admission allows the wife to give evidence
indirectly.
The old proverb, "Silence gives consent," seems the basis for the
general rule that, under certain circumstances, silence is admissible
as evidence of guilt,8 the reason advanced being that the accused
impliedly ratifies and adopts the words used.4 Therefore, the evidence is not the statements but the addressed party's conduct and the
inferences deducible therefrom. 5 It follows logically that the rule
remains unaltered where the one making the statement is incompetent, as in the case of a husband or wife.6 Thus the second ground
for dissenting seems untenable. However, silence is admissible only
where the statements tend to make a material charge against the
OF PARTY MAKING STATEMENTS-In an arson

' State v. Freeman, 197 N. C. 376, 148 S. E. 450 (1929).
N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919), §1802, which provides in substance that a
wife is not competent to give evidence against her husband in any criminal
action.
'2 WrGm6a, EVIDENCE (1923), §1071; State v. Jackson, 158 N. C. 31, 64
S. E. 376 (1909), in which Justice Hoke gives a full discussion of the rule, its
limitation and dangers. From this, the circumstances under which.silence is
admissible seem to be: (1) the party addressed must hear and understand the
language, (2) he must also have knowledge of the subject matter of the statement, (3) the declaration must be made under circumstances and by such a person as to naturally call for a reply. State v. Walton, 172 N. C. 931, 90 S. E.
518 (1916).
A similar principle permits proof of statements in the presence of a prosecuting witness for purposes of impeachment. State v. Burton, 94 N. C. 947
(1886).
'Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S. W. 592 (1904).
'State v. Jackson, supra note 3; Note (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 549.
'3 JoNEs, COMMENTARIES ON EVImENCE (2nd ed., 1926), §1046; Highsmith v.
Page, 161 N. C. 356, 77 S. E. 294 (1913). Although this is the weight of
authority, there are decisions to the contrary, based on the common law incompetency of the husband and wife testifying for or against each other.
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 126 Mo. 846, 29 S. W. 603 (1893).
2
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7
accused and the circumstances make it natural for him to speak.
Whether the words call for a contradiction depends both upon the
character of the words and the surrounding circumstances, the test
probably being whether reasonable men would feel called on to
8
answer in a similar situation.

The question of admissibility of such evidence, i.e., whether the
circumstances were such that the jury could reasonably find that the
accused's conduct was an indication of guilt, is a preliminary question of fact for the court.9 But whether the silence actually was an
admission and what weight it should have as evidence, is a question
for the jury in view of the surrounding circumstances.' 0 Therefore,
the court cannot charge as a matter of law that the evidence amounts
to an admission."
Because of the many possible innocent explanations of silence and
the tremendous effect such statements have upon the jury, all courts
2
describe this as dangerous evidence to be cautiously received.' Still
it is difficult to see how its admissibility can be carefully guarded
while the judge only rules on whether the statements could reasonGuy v. Manuel, 89 N. C. 83 (1883) ; Note (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564.
'Rice v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. Reg. 149, 112 S. W. 299 (1908) ; State v.
Sudduth, 74 S. C. 498, 54 S. E. 1013 (1906) ; 3 JoNEs, CommENTAms ox EviDE cE (2nd ed., 1926), §1044.

The following cases are illustrations of situations where silence was held
admissible. Kenyon v. Vogel, 250 Mass. 351, 145 N. E. 462 (1924), (failure
to deny statements of chauffeur at police station as to employment) ; State v.
Record, 151 N. C. 695, 65 S.E. 1010 (1909), (where wife within hearing of
husband claimed stolen goods belonged to him) ; State v. Randel, 170 N. C.
757, 87 S. E. 227 (1915), (wife's statement before husband and officers, "I
have tried to get you to quit selling liquor and now I'm through") ; State v.
McKinney, 175 N. C. 784, 95 S. E. 162 (1912), (where the wife declared, "I
have told you a thousand times about selling whiskey and that you would get
caught").
But in other cases the circumstances were held insufficient to allow admission. Davis v. State, 85 Miss. 416, 37 So. 1018 (1905), (wife said in presence
of husband, "If he had listened to me, he wouldn't have gone down there and
the man wouldn't have been killed" held irrelevant as it accused him of nothing
and made no charge requiring denial) ; Guy v. Manuel, supra note 7 (statement
concerning location of land before plaintiff acquired it, held not admissible by
his silence because he had no present interest in the land at the time) ; State v.
Booth, 185 N. C. 625, 115 S.E. 889 (1923), (in a prosecution for assault wife's
declaration, "Lord, that is Herbert's knife," inadmissible because made an
appreciable time after the assault and because it wasn't clearly shown that
Herbert heard the remark).
'Pierce v. Pierce, 66 Vt. 369, 29 Atl. 364 (1894).
" State v. Blackburn, 7 Pennewill's (Del.) Rep. 479, 75 Atl. 536 (1892).
McCurken v. Carlson, 20 N. Y. Week. Dig. 424, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574
(1910).
" State v. Jackson, supra note 2; 3 JONEs, COIMMENTARIES ON EvIDENCE
(2nd ed., 1926), §1047.
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ably be taken as an admission. One suggestion is that the judge in
his charge warn the jury against considering the statements as having any evidential value except in so far as they believe the silence
was an admission of the statement. But as a practical matter we
know this can have but little effect in reducing the impression the
words made on the jury. A more effective way would be to have
the judge decide as a preliminary question of fact whether the silence actually was an admission, 13 since a natural tendency to exaggerate the importance of silence and to accept the accusation itself
as evidence of guilt would sway the jury but not the judge. Clearly
under the existing law the instant case is correct but under the suggested practice, it is possible that the trial judge would have excluded
the evidence.
LAwRENcE WALLACE.
MORTGAGES-ASSUMPTION OF DEB---EQUITY OF REDEmPTION-

In the recent North Carolina case of Harvey v. Kinston Knitting

Co., 1 it was held that a purchase at receiver's sale of an equity of redemption in land, "subject to and burdened with lien" of a mortgage
is not an assumption of the mortgage debt. 2 There must be an express assumption,3 except where the consideration named is the full
value of the land unincumbered, and the purchaser pays the mort-

"In Gila Valley RR. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 102, 34 S. Ct. 229 (1913),
where defendant to show that plaintiff had notice of a defective piece of machinery, offered evidence of a conversation concerning the defect, within two
hundred yards of plaintiff held that whether the plaintiff heard the conversation
was a question of fact for the court and consequently that whether the circumstances showed an admission is to be determined 'by the judge. But see
criticism of this case in (1914) 27 HA v. L. REv. 490. For a discussion of this
subject generally, see Maguire, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining
the Admissibility of Evidence (1929) 40 HAxv. L. REv. 392.
'Harvey v. Kinston Knitting Co., 197 N. C. 177, 148 S. E. 177 (1929).
'Accord: Braun v. Crew, 183 Cal. 728, 192 Pac. 531 (1920) ; Interstate Land
& Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 598, 72 So. 36 (1916) ; Schult v. Doyle, 200
Iowa 1, 201 N. W. 787 (1925) ; Morrison v. Farmers & Traders State Bank,
70 Mont. 146, 225 Pac. 123 (1924) ; Brown v. Leeak, 52 N. D. 398, 203 N. W.
185 (1925); Van Nostrand & Co. v. Virginia Zinc & Chem. Corp., 126 Va. 131,
101 S. E. 65 (1919) ; Strong v. Converse, 8 Allen 557, 85 Am Dec. 732 (Mass.

1864).

' Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 501, 119 S. E. 898 (1923) ; Ayers v. Makely,
131 N. C. 60, 42 S. E. 454 (1902) ; Belmont v. Cowan, 22 N. Y. 438, 78 Am.
Dec. 213 (1860) ; Goode v. Bryant, 118 Va. 314, 87 S. E. 588 (1916) ; Thacker
v. Hubbard & Appleby, 122 Va. 379, 94 S. E. 929 (1918) ; Barber v. Hanie, 163
N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57 (1913) ; South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 108 S. C. 475,
95 S. E. 65 (1918). The agreement may be in the deed, verbal, or in a separate
instrument: Kirby v. Young, 145 Ark. 507, 224 S. W. 970 (1920) ; Knighton v.
Chamberlain, 84 Ore. 153, 164 Pac. 703 (1917) ; Parlier v. Miller, supra.
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gagor the difference between the agreed purchase price and the mortgage, when there is an implied assumption. 4 The assumption must
be supported by a consideration. 5 The difference between taking the
equity of redemption "subject to" a mortgage and taking it "assuming the mortgage" is this: the latter makes a purchaser personally
liable for the debt, and, therefore, for any deficiency outstanding
after foreclosure, while in the former instance there is no personal
liability for the debt and the land alone may be taken.0 If there is
an honest mistake and the deed reads "subject to" when in fact the
agreement was to assume the debt, then the courts will order a reformation of the instrument to accord with the intention of the
parties. 7 Having once assumed or agreed to pay a mortgage upon
property conveyed, the grantee is estopped thereafter from challenging the validity of the mortgage as of the time of the agreement. 8
The reason for the rule of the principal case seems clear when it
is understood that the transaction which resulted in the mortgage, and
the transfer of the land subject to the mortgage are entirely separate
and apart. The mortgagor's original promise to pay the debt constitutes a unilateral contract; in addition the mortgagor gives the mortgagee the power to take certain land if he fails to perform his contract, and the mortgagor becomes personally liable for the full amount
of the debt. When the land is transferred subject to the mortgage,
the right of the mortgagee to take that land still exists, as does the
mortgagor's personal responsibility. No contract has been trans'Allgood v. Spearman, 125 S. C. 131, 118 S. E. 189 (1923); Ellet v. Mc

Ghee, 94 Va. 377, 26 S. E. 874 (1897) ; Brosseau v. Lowy, 209 Ill. 405, 70 N. E.
901 (1904) ; Canfield v. Shearer, 49 Mich. 313, 13 N. W. 605 (1882) ; Sander-

son v. Turner, 73 Okla. 105, 174 Pac. 763, 2 A. L. R. 347 (1918) ; (1928) 4 Wis.
L. REv. 504; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPE.TY (2nd ed., 1920) §2490; 1 WIL'rsxE,
MORTGAGE FoRcLosuRE (4th. ed., 1927) §238; White v. Schader, 185 Cal. 606,
198 Pac. 18, 21 A. L. R. 499 (1921).
'Rector v. Lyda, 180 N. C. 588, 105 S. E. 170 (1923) ; Ludlum v. Pinckard,
304 Ill. 449, 136 N. E. 725 (1922) ; Brown v. Leeak, supra note 2; Boyd v.

Winte, 65 Okla. 141, 164 Pac. 781 (1917) ; People's Trust Co. v. Doolittle, 165
N. Y. Supp. 813, 178 App. Div. 802 (1917). If the mortgage is part of the
purchase price the grantee is estopped from denying the consideration: Clark v.
Scott, 212 S. W. 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; Guthrie v. Ensign, 26 Idaho 687,
213 Pac. 354 (1923) ; State Finance Co. v. Moore, 103 Wash. 398, 174 Pac. 22
(1918).
' See cases cited, supra notes 2 and 3.
'Williams v. Everham, 90 Iowa 420, 57 N. W. 901 (1894).
' Robinowitz v. Marcus, 100 Conn. 86, 123 Atl. 21 (1923) ; Clark Investment
Co. v. Cunningham, 108 Kan. 703, 197 Pac. 212 (1921). See Currie v. LaFon,
133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246 (1908) ; Newton v. Evers, 143 App. Div. 673,
128 N. Y. Supp. 327 (1911) ; Schuber v. McDuffie, 67 Okla. 160, 169 Pac. 642
(1918) ; Keller v. Parrish, 196 N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929).
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ferred, however. The tranferee owes no duty to the mortgagee upon
the debt, and the mortgagee's rights against him relate only to protection of the security. The rights against the land and the mortgagor remain as they were in the beginning. 9 To impose personal
liability on the transferee for a deficiency after applying the proceeds
of the sale of the land to the mortgage debt, would, in the absence
of express assumption, act to curb exchanges of this sort; but under
the present rule investors of small means are encouraged to purchase
equities of redemption upon the chance of enhancement of the property and of payment of the debt, risking no more than the amount of
the "margin!' paid.
Prior to the principle case the North Carolina court had been
called upon, in this general connection, to construe and deal only with
instruments purporting to be express assumptions.1 0 This is the first
case in North Carolina in which the generally accepted result that a
mere purchase of incumbered land imposes no personal liability on
the purchaser in the absence of an explicit assumption, or a deduction
of the amount of the mortgage from the stated price, is applied.
T. A. UZZELL, JR.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-DISTINCTION BETWEEN LICENSE AND FRAN-

cHISE---CoTToN GINNING AS A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC
INTEREST-Cotton gins were declared by an Oklahoma statute to be
public utilities, and a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Corporation Commission was required as a condition precedent to the right to operate. Plaintiff procured such a certificate
upon evidence establishing a public necessity for a cotton gin in his
community. The statute was later amended to allow coOperative
corporations to operate cotton gins without showing a necessity for
the service. Plaintiff brought a bill in equity to enjoin the Commission from issuing a permit to defendant cooperative corporation, on
the ground that the statutory amendment was a violation of the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held, plaintiff's permit to operate was a franchise and a property
right, which was impaired without reasonable basis by the amendment to the statute1
' Keller v. Parrish, 196 N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929).
" Parlier v. Miller, Barber v. Hanie, supra note 3; Rector v. Lyda, supra

note 5.
'Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 246, 49 S. Ct.
235 (1929).
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It is well settled that the difference between a license and a franchise lies in the fact that the former is a non-contractual, revocable
permission, 2 while the latter is a property right which is the subject of
a contract between the parties.3 There is, however, no rule-of-thumb
to determine into which class a given grant from the state falls. A
public utility can operate under either, 4 though where its operation
is dependent upon the use of public lands, the grant is usually held
to be a franchise. 5 But that the use of such lands cannot be a determinative factor of general application is demonstrated by the holding that any corporate capacity, irrespective of whether the use of
public land is involved, is a franchise. 6 It has been suggested that
the test is whether the permit is essential to the purpose of the
grantee and of such a nature that a private party could not grant a
similar permission over his land. 7 This test is obviously of no value
where, as in the instant case, the use of public property is not involved. It would seem that, in last analysis, neither inherent characteristics nor a legalistic formula to detect them are necessary. The
real question that the courts are answering is whether the financial
outlay by the grantee and his relation to the paramount public good
make it reasonable to give him the greater protection termed franchise, or the lesser termed license.8
The instant case was contested on the issue of whether a classification favoring cooperative corporations over natural or artificial
persons was so arbitrary as to contravene the equal protection clause.0
That the more fundamental issue of the right of the state to regulate
cotton ginning was not raised is probably attributable to the doctrine
now applied in state regulation of public enterprises. State price
217 R. C. L. 473.
312 R. C. L. 175.
'Frost
v. Corporation Commission, supra note 1, at 533.
5
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 S.

Ct 77 (1898) ; Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400, 33

S. Ct. 997 (1913); City of Ownesboro v. Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co., 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, 33 S. Ct. 988 (1913).

' California v. Pacific Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 40-41, 32 L. ed. 150, 8 S.
Ct. 1073 (1888).
'McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 158 Fed. 5, 10-11 (C. C.

A. 8th. 1907).
'This idea is hinted at in Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, supra note 5. The
question was whether the right to lay water pipes in city streets was a license
or a franchise. The court said, p. 91, "The presumption is that no such enterprise would have been entered upon if the street easement was subject to immediate revocation."
'For a discussion of the merits of this question, see Tobacco Grower's Cooperative Association v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 117 S. E. 174 (1923). See also

Brown, Co-Operative Marketing of Tobacco (1923) 1 N. C. L. REv. 216.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
and service regulation' ° was originally based on the theory that an
enterprise enjoying a position of virtual monopoly stifled the stabilizing forces of competition" and could therefore be regulated. 12 However, to sustain a utility-declaring statute, it is no longer necessary
that judicial review should disclose the existence of a condition of
virtual monopoly. The courts now declare that such a statute is constitutional where there appears any physical, social, or economic factor to make it reasonable to declare the business public. They justify
this position by the principle that the legislature is the proper policydetermining branch of the government. 13 Litigants, therefore, proceed on precarious ground when they seek the reversal of such a
legislative declaration of policy. 14 This definite cleavage between
co~rdinate branches of the government on a matter of policy seems
undesirable. It may make decisions easier to render, but the possibility of changing private businesses to public utilities by mere legislative fiat is materially increased.
The question of regulating cotton ginning has never arisen in this
jurisdiction. However, the public interest in low ginning rates and
ample facilities was recognized in Shute v. Shute,' 5 by setting aside
a contract to cease ginning in a certain locality as one in restraint of
trade.' 6
"

J. H.

CHADBoURN.

Of course the state can pass health and safety regulations under its police

power. See post note 16. See also Note (1928) 6 N. C. L. REV. 459.
' In the instant case competition, not monopoly, is restrained. Stone, J., in
dissenting, makes the point that, inasmuch as it is the policy of the state not to
restrain competition, plaintiff's injury is the same that he would suffer under
a non-discriminatory statute by the normal increase of competitors, and hence
is damnuin absque injuria. This view suggests mention of the fact that competition may involve economic duplication and waste, and thus become as subversive of the public interest as unregulated monopoly (1919) 33 HARV. L. REv.
577. For a recent application of the principle that completion should not be
restrained see Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429, 73 L. ed. 277, 49 S. Ct.
196 (1929).
" Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876). A statute regulating
charges for elevating grain was upheld because of the existence of a condition
of virtual monopoly. The dissenting judges thought that the state could regulate only those businesses that it had licensed.
"Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press & Manufacturing Co., 53 Tex. 172
(1880) ; Selligson v. Taylor Compress Co., 56 Tex. 219 (1882) ; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 289, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 Sup. Ct. 612
(1913).
" Thus the right of the state to regulate ginning has never been tested. In
the only other cases found dealing with the subject this issue, as in the instant
case, was not raised. State v. Sims, 80 Okla. 254, 196 Pac. 132 (1921) ; Tallasse Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Hollway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 (1917).
"176 X. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392 (1918), Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade in
North Carolina (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 248, 261, note 43.
" Taft, C. J., in Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court of Kansas, 262 U. S.
522, 67 L. ed. 1103, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1923), classified in three groups businesses
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TRADE REGULATION-INJUNCTIONS-COVENANTS

IN RESTRAINT

OF EMPLOYEES! COMPETITION WITH EMPLOYER AFTER TERMINATION

OF EMPLOYMENT-Where the defendant, an employee of the plaintiff,
a public accountant, covenanted not to solicit or accept his employer's

former customers for a period of three years after leaving the plaintiff's employ, it was held that an injunction restraining defendant from
soliciting or accepting' plaintiff's former customers was properly con-

2
tinued until the final hearing.
If the owner of a business and goodwill covenants with his vendee
not to compete, the space and time restrictions being reasonable, it
is well established that an injunction will issue to prevent such competition,5 due regard being had for the interests of the public. 4 The
5
North Carolina court has so held in the cases of a manufacturer,

barber,6 editor,7 photographer, 8 livery stable owner,9 and fish dealer.' 0
The same rule applies to the sale of a profitable profession."
subject to regulation: 1. Those carried on under authority of public grant.
2. Certain occupations regarded as exceptional, and historically subject to regulation, e. g., inns, cabs, and grist mills. 3. Those originally private, but now
affected with a public interest. This classification, it will be noted, does not
take cognizance of the regulation of admittedly private businesses under the
police power of the state. Examples of the use of this power need no citation.
For examples of the exercise of the emergency police power, see Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 306 (1920), aff'd. 256 U. S. 170
(1921); American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Fuel Commission of
Indiana, 268 Fed. 563 (D. C. Ind. 1920). For a categorical list of businesses
that have been held to be affected with a public interest, see Note (1906) 6
L. R. A. (N. S.) 834.
'Empire Steam Laundry Co. v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 Pac. 1180, 44 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1159 (1913), criticised in (1913) 1 CALiF. L. Rnv. 385. Contra:
Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 Pac. 990 (1916) where defendant
employee was enjoined from soliciting but not from receiving work of former
customers-decision based on constitutional right of a person to have work
done where he desires.
" Scott v. Gillis, 197 N. C. 223, 148 S. E. 315 (1929).
"Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887);
Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813, 34 L. R. A. 389 (1896). See Carpenter, Validity of Contracts not to Compete (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. RFV. 244,
258; (1928) 3 CAMB. L. J. 262; (1927) 2 WAsH. L. REv 245; N. C. Cons. Stat.
Ann. (1919), §2563 ss. 6.
"Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way & Co., 169 N. C. 679, 86 S. E. 603 (1915);
cf. Winthrop v. Allen, 122 S. C. 536, 115 S. E. 745 (1922). Note (1920) 9 A.
L. R. 1467.
'Kramer v. Old, supra note 3.
'Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. 1096 (1914). Contra: Brown v.
Williams, 166 Ga. 747, 144 S. E. 256 (1928). See (1928) 13 MINN. L. Rxv. 59.
Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212 (1896).
'Baumgarten v. Broadway, 77 N. C. 8 (1877).
'Anders v. Gardner, 151 N. C. 604, 66 S. E. 665 (1910).
" Sea Food Co. v. Way & Co., mipra note 4, Clark, C. J., dissenting.
'Randolph v. Graham, 254 S. W. 402 (Tex. Civ. App. (1923) ; Rowe v.
Toon, 185 Ia. 848, 169 N. W. 38 (1918) ; cf. Thompson Optical Inst. v. Thomp-

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
But when an employee covenants with his employer not to engage
in a similar business for himself or for a competitor after the termination of his employment, the recent English cases, which seem to be
supported by the better reasoning, "show a tendency to restrict enforcement unless the primary purpose is to protect the employer from
unfair practices or conduct by the employee in taking advantage of
the prior relationship."' 2 These cases illustrate the valid distinction
between competition per se, against which the employer may not have
an injunction, 13 and protection of confidential trade secrets, for which
an injunction is allowed when necessary to preserve the employer's
business and goodwill.' 4 However, some jurisdictions, refusing to
acknowledge the distinction, continue to hold that the principle is the
same for an employee's promise not to compete as for a similar covenant by a vendor of a business. 15
son, 119 Or. 252, 237 Pac. 965 (1925).

Contra: Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga.

188, 30 S. E. 735, 69 A. S. R. 154 (1898).
"Mason v. Provident Clothing &Supply Co. (1913), A. C. 724, 29 T. L. R.

727 (the earliest English case to make the distinction) ; Morris v. Saxelby,
(1916) 1 App. Cas. 688; Bowler v. Lovegrove (1921) 1 Ch. 642, 37 T. L. R.
424, placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove some circumstance which required the covenant for the protection of his business; Atwood v. Lamont
(1920) 3 K. B. 571, "employer cannot protect himself against competition
per se."
"Samuel Stores v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 AtL 541, 543, (1919), 9
A. L. R. 1450, 1454 (1920) with Note 1456 [see also note (1928) 52 A. L.
R. 1362] defendant, a manager of plaintiff's store was not enjoined from
competing, Curtis, J. saying, " . . . restrictive stipulations in agreements between employer and employee are not viewed with the same indulgence as such
stipulations between a vendor and a vendee of a business and goodwill";
Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 66, 188 N. Y. Supp. 678
(1921) ; Eagle Dairy Co. v. Dylag, 30 OHio L. R. 361 (1929) -injunction was
denied on the further ground that defendant was an infant when he entered the
agreement, a subject on which the cases are still divided. See Note (1920) 9
A. L. R. 1483.
4 Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N. E. 568 (1922) ; Glucol Mfg.

Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 214 N. W. 152 (1927) decision based on Mich.

Comp. Laws (Cahill 1915) §15033 which provides that all contracts not to work
are void; cf. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering 1927) §1673-5; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) §§5928-30. But see N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2563, ss. 6. See Carpenter, Validity of Contractsnot to Compete (1928) 76 U. oF P. L. Rxv. 244;
Kales, Contracts to Refrain from Doing Business or from Entering or Carrying on an Occupation (1917) 31 HARv. L. Rav. 193; Note (1928) 44 L. Q. Rav.
66.
The same rule applies even though there is no express covenant if the circumstances of the case imply such an agreement. Radium Remedies Co. v.
Weiss, 173 Minn. 342, 217 N. W. 339 (1928); Note (1916) YALE L. J. 499.
But courts, in the absence of a contract or of some fraud, are more prone to
decide that customer lists, etc., are not trade secrets. Laundry Co. v. Johnson,
supra note 1.
'Ward Baking Co. v. Tolley, 225 N. Y. Supp. 75 (1927), injunction granted
per curiam, two justices dissenting; Ice Delivery Co. v. Evans, 275 S. W. 87
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It seems that such a view fails to consider that a contract between
a rich employer and an idle employee (being drawn very often so as
to prevent the latter from quitting his job) is usually less favorable
to such employee than a contract for the sale of a business is to the
vendor. 18 The consideration for the restraint is obviously less compensatory.
The decision of the instant case is undoubtedly correct. In as
much as the remarks of the court-intimating that the contract of an
employee not to compete with his employer would be enforced on the
same principle as a contract for the sale of a business with an agreement not to compete-were not necessary to the decision of the case,
it is hoped that the North Carolina Court will consider the rational
distinction suggested when the proper occasion arises.

J. B. LEwis.
TRUsTs-REvoCABILITY OF VOLUNTARY TRUSTS-STATUTORY
CHANGES-In Stanback v. Citizens National Bank of Raleigh,' the

plaintiff's aunt and co-plaintiff created a voluntary trust whereby the
defendant was to hold 260 shares of stock, to pay the income to the
plaintiff until he should reach the age of 50 years, at which time the
trust was to terminate and the corpus to be paid over to the plaintiff;
or, if the plaintiff should die before reaching 50, then to his issue,
if any, per stirpes, or to his next of kin according to the statute of
distributions. About 15 months later the aunt and nephew jointly
executed and delivered to the trustee a paper purporting to revoke the
trust as to the issue and next of kin of the nephew, at the same time
requesting the trustee to turn over 130 shares of the stock to the
nephew as owner, the remainder to be held under the terms of the
original trust. The trustee refused, on the ground that the contingent interests expressed in the trust could not be thus destroyed.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925), defendant was only enjoined from his old route even
though the contract extended to the five adjoining blocks; Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926), where the contract restrained
competition- throughout the whole State of Mass., defendant was enjoined
from competing in Boston, but only from soliciting old customers in the rest

of the State, the court ineffectively distinguishing Sherman v. Pfefferkorn,
supra note 14; Sarco Co. v. Gulliver, 3 N. J. Misc, 647, 129 Atl. 399 (1925),
held to be a "reasonable covenant to prevent competition"; 3 WxuL~isroN, CoxTRACrs (1922)
§1643 " . . . the distinction seems inadvisable. .. " See
(1925) 4 TEx. L. R v. 114.
W LsToN, CoNTRAcTs (1922) §1643; Note (1920) 9 A. L. R. 1456.
197 N. C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929).

RECENT CASE COMMENTS

Held; that the revocation was effective under N. C. Con. Stat. Ann.
(1919) §9962 as amended by act Mar. 19, 1929.
Under the common law even a voluntary settlement in trust, fully
executed, with no power of revocation reserved, is irrevocable in the
absence of mistake, undue influence, or fraud.4 A few courts, however, have held that the absence of a reserved power of revocation in
a voluntary settlement is prima facie evidence of mistake.6 But this
has been denied. 6 Where revocation has been allowed, the courts
appear to have been motivated by the unique facts and by the peculiar equities of each case, rather than by preconceived notions of
what should constitute grounds for relief. Thus, revocation has been
allowed where the settlement was for the sole benefit of a young settler, in virtual continuation of a guardianship,7 and both the settler
and trustee thought the trust was revocable ;S where a young man,
on the day following his mother's funeral, created the trust on the
advice of relatives, believing it to be merely a temporary family arrangement ;9 where a young woman, not in contemplation of marriage, was urged to execute the deed of trust by her mother and
grandfather ;10 where the settler, immediately after his release from
the army, and having no business experience, conveyed all of his
property in trust to his father, who exerted great influence over him ;11
",The grantor in any voluntary conveyance in which some future interest
in real estate is conveyed or limited to a person not in esse may, at any time
before he comes into being, revoke by deed such interest so conveyed or
limited."
2 "The grantor, maker or trustor who has heretofore created or may hereafter create a voluntary trust estate in real or personal property for the use
and benefit of himself or of any other person or persons in esse with a future
contingent interest to some person or persons not in esse or not determined
until the happening of a future event may at any time prior to the happening
of the contingency vesting the future estates, revoke the grant of interest to
such person not in esse or not determined by a proper instrument to that
effect." N. C. Pub. Laws 1929, c. 305.
' Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300 (1872) ; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co.,
195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300, 12 Ann. Cas. 837 (1907) ; Appeal of Fellows, 93
Pa. 470 (1879) ; Kraft v. Neuffler, 202 Pa. 558, 52 Atl. 100 (1902) ; McElveen
v. Adams, 108 S. C. 437, 94 S.E. 733 (1917) ; Neisler v. Pearsall, 32 R. I. 367,
48 At. 8 (1901) ; Sargent v. Baldwin, 60 Vt. 17, 13 At. 854 (1888).
"Aylesworth v. Whitcomb, 12 R. I. 298 (1879) ; Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa. St.
269 (1874). See also Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243 (1873) and Note in
(1874) 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S.345. But see Neisler v. Pearsall, supra note 4.
'Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 4.
"Stevens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923).
'Aylesworth v. Whitcomb, supra note 5.
'Kerr v. Couper, 5 Del. Ch. 507 (1883).
Bristor v. Tasker, 135 Pa. 110, 19 Atl. 851 (1890).
Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223, 31 N. E. 64 (1892) and Note in (1893) 19
L. R. A. 767.
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where a German woman, unable to understand English, joined with
her husband in executing a deed of trust whereby she relinquished
her dower and homestead rights, her acknowledgement being taken
by a Justice of the Peace who did not understand German ;12 where
the aged settler, pending an appeal from an order putting him under
guardianship for insanity, executed the trust under much pressure
from relatives ;18 and where the settler's confidential advisor received
a benefit under the settlement. 14 In most of these cases, the trust
was created for the sole benefit of the settler. 15
Apart from statute, 16 and in the absence of factors such as those
just illustrated, provisions for undetermined and contingent beneficiaries have as a rule operated to prevent termination of the trust
by a joinder of the present cestui and the settler.' 7 The decision in
the principal case thus rests wholly upon the Act of 1929. That
statute makes any finding of mistake, undue influence or fraud unnecessary; joinder of present beneficiaries is not required; and revo..
cation by the settler of a voluntary trust is empowered notwithstanding the presence of contingent provisions for persons not in esse or
not determinable until a future event. By being retroactive and 'by
its appropriativeness, it bears evidence of having been made for the
convenience of the parties to the case in hand.
PEYTON

B. ABBOTT.

Schaper v. Schaper, 84 I1. 603 (1877).
Kellett v. Sumner, 15 Hawaii 76 (1903).
"'Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893).
'Additional cases are: Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194
N. Y. Supp. 614 (1922) ; Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky.
823, 268 S. W. 537 (1925) ; and see Note in (1925) 38 A. L. R. 941 collecting
and classifying the cases.
" New York Personal Property Law (Cons. Laws c. 41) §23: "Upon the
written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal
property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of
such trust may revoke the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof."
For a discussion of cases decided under this statute, see (1929) 7 N. Y. L. M.
42.
17Wood v. Gridley, 217 Ill. App. 579 (1920) ; Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore.
585, 230 Pac. 554 (1924) ; King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 At1. 227
(1923) ; Johnson v. Providence Trust Co., 280 Pa. 255, 124 Atl. 436 (1924) ;
In re Jones' Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 90, 130 Atl. 314 (1925) ; Underhill v. U. S.
Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d.) 502 (1929). But see Johns v. Birmingham Trust Co., 205 Ala. 535, 88 So. 835 (1921).

